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In 1942 John Houseman, a well-known radio, theater and film producer, 
inaugurated a government international radio propaganda broadcasting station: 
the Voice of America. The Roosevelt administration had used the printed press, 
movies and radio to put its views before the American people; Roosevelt himself 
had demonstrated his great mastery over the art of radio through his fireside 
chats.1 But American overseas radio propaganda was an uncharted course.2 
Houseman and his fellow propagandists were aware, of course, of German and 
British propaganda; but Houseman had no intention of imitating foreign broad-
casts, only of reproducing what he, and others, believed to be the powerful 
effects of these propaganda efforts. How Houseman was to create American 
propaganda, therefore, and what forms of broadcasting might prove most effec-
tive were decisions left to him. It was an exciting challenge, and Houseman 
took up the task with enthusiasm. 
When Houseman established the Voice of America, he considered a wide 
variety of broadcasting formats. He wanted to create a special American sound, 
a sound which would announce to the overseas listener that this was America 
speaking. And Houseman, who did not come out of the world of journalism, 
as did most of the other leaders of American overseas propaganda, developed a 
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propaganda style which emphatically did not imitate that of traditional radio 
news and information. It was a unique sound which still startles the contem-
porary listener and raises several important questions. What did Houseman's 
Voice of America really sound like? Why did it sound as it did? And what 
impact upon the very nature of American overseas propaganda did this sound 
have? 
Propaganda, according to Harold LasswelTs classic definition, is "the control 
of opinion by significant symbols." Radio propaganda is effected through the 
special medium of broadcasting, which is, in its barest sense, the art of what can 
be done with a microphone at one end and an amplifier at the other. Radio 
exists in pure sound, without vision; it works through the vehicle of the spoken 
word; and it is an art created by verbal patterns of pitch, duration and rhythm.3 
Radio broadcasting, and hence radio propaganda, is an art with its own 
forms and styles. In order to understand Houseman's Voice of America, there-
fore, it is critical that we view form not as a superimposed addition to content, 
but as an intrinsic means of giving expression to content. In this sense, form 
is important in the entire field of radio, and not just in what one might call the 
"high culture" of radio drama and features.4 Through looking at Houseman's 
artistic, or formal decisions, we can fit Houseman's Voice of America into a 
broader cultural framework. We can, furthermore, investigate what messages 
were implicit in these forms, what listening audience Houseman envisioned, and 
finally begin to explore the impact the Voice of America may have had in war-
torn Europe in 1942 and 1943. In order to answer these questions we will first 
describe the context in which Houseman inaugurated the Voice of America, go 
on to the radio styles and forms from which he drew his models, and proceed 
to the- Voice of America broadcasts. In other words, we will move from the 
historic and artistic background to the propaganda itself. 
During the years between the two world wars the fear of propaganda, which 
had first been generated by the campaigns of mass persuasion launched by both 
Allies and Central Powers during World War I, increased with the success of 
fascism in the thirties.5 But international propaganda did not become a matter 
of urgent concern until April, May and June, 1940, when the Nazis swept across 
Western Europe, devouring Norway, Holland, Denmark, Belgium and France. 
Americans were shocked by the staggering success of the German army. The 
French had been protected by the Maginot Line and by as strong an army as 
existed in the West: yet France had collapsed within weeks of the German 
assault. France failed, many came to believe, because the French will to resist 
had been undermined by Nazi propaganda. It had been a battle won by words, 
in which the first, and crucial blow had come over the airwaves. 
In the months following the Battle of Britain, President Roosevelt agreed to 
the establishment of an executive agency charged with overseas intelligence and 
overseas propaganda. President Roosevelt appointed William J. Donovan to be 
the Coordinator of Information (COI) in July of 1941. Donovan, in turn, asked 
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the New Deal liberal playwright and Presidential speech writer, Robert Sher-
wood, to take over the direction of international propaganda. Sherwood agreed 
to do so, and chose short-wave radio as America's principal medium for over-
seas propaganda. It was not until the shock of Pearl Harbor, however, that 
Roosevelt felt that the American government could create its own radio station, 
rather than work indirectly through the private radio industry. On December 26, 
1941, Sherwood asked John Houseman to inaugurate a government propaganda 
station. Houseman agreed. The Voice of America went on the air six weeks 
later, and Houseman remained its director until June, 1943.6 
The American propaganda station began during some of the bitterest months 
of the Allied war effort. In Russia the Germans besieged Sebastopol; in North 
Africa General Rommel outflanked the British; and in the Pacific the Japanese 
took Hong Kong and Manila. This was, moreover, largely a period of latent 
war in the West for the Americans. America did not actively take the offensive 
in Europe until November 8, 1942, when—eleven months after Pearl Harbor— 
the United States and its Western Allies invaded North Africa. From December, 
1941 until November, 1942, therefore, the American propagandists could not talk 
about military progress in Europe. They had not only to find subjects that made 
suitable propaganda, but to make propaganda substitute for military action.7 
Against this backdrop of events, Donovan, Sherwood and Houseman decided 
that radio propaganda had to be an aggressive tool of warfare. The Voice of 
America was to urge Europeans to resist the Axis; it was to be "the initial arrow 
of penetration, in conditioning and preparing the people and territory in which 
invasion is contemplated."8 It was to be a fourth fighting arm of war, capable 
of changing men's minds and able to provoke them to action.9 This definition 
of propaganda dominated the Voice of America throughout 1942 and the first 
half of 1943. As an in-house report stated in the winter of 1943, "Propaganda 
warfare is not merely a battle of words. It is a battle for people's minds and 
through their minds their physical actions."10 
ii 
John Houseman, born Jacques Haussman on September 22, 1902, to a 
Welsh-Irish-British mother and a Jewish-Alsatian father, was a man whose skills 
included radio production, a knowledge of European culture and politics and a 
mastery of several foreign languages.11 He was a commanding and charismatic 
man with an artistic vision and the force of personality to make his ideas come 
alive. As director of the Voice of America he could be found everywhere, 
directing the shows, editing the scripts and providing a great fund of ideas for 
the propaganda broadcasts. One British observer wrote home soon after House-
man left the Voice in June, 1943, that he was a natural propagandist, "an 
executive who combined dramatic ability with real driving power."12 After 
abandoning a first career as an international grain broker in the wake of the 
stock market crash of 1929, Houseman became a live theater producer. He 
staged works by Virgil Thomson, Maxwell Anderson and Archibald MacLeish, 
and in 1935 went to work for the newly created Federal Theater Project (FTP) 
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of the Works Projects Administration (WPA). There he began his long collabo-
ration with Orson Welles.13 Two years later, Houseman and Welles started the 
Mercury Theatre which in 1938 spun off the Mercury Theatre, on the Air, 
Houseman and Welles adapted for this series H. G. Wells' science fiction 
fantasy of an invasion from Mars: The War of the Worlds. The two producers 
began their program with an anonymously read meteorological bulletin, inter-
spersed with interviews and music. Only minutes into the program, however, 
the newscaster shifted gears and breathlessly began describing a Martian inva-
sion. Houseman and Welles employed radio newscasting techniques in order to 
blur the distinction between fiction and news, or, as Houseman later wrote: "to 
slide swiftly and imperceptibly out of the 'real' time of a news report into the 
* dramatic' time of a fictional broadcast. Once that was achieved . . . there was 
no extreme of fantasy through which they [the audience] would not follow us."14 
It was a sensational production, which soon became known as the "panic 
broadcast" because it generated such fear among listeners that men and women 
living close to the supposed invasion site literally fled their homes in terror. 
The War of the Worlds heightened American consciousness of the power of 
radio to persuade men and women to act. But it was playing with fire, and 
neither Houseman nor Welles, nor any other radio producer, attempted ever 
again to reproduce its effects for a domestic audience. Yet when Houseman 
became director of the Voice of America, War of the Worlds stood as proof that 
radio could be used to great effect.15 
As a versatile, experienced producer, and as a European, Houseman was 
thoroughly familiar with the whole range of styles which dominated American 
radio and European and American theater during the thirties. As a propagandist 
he considered these forms and as he began operations he quickly decided to 
discard some and to adopt and rework others. His options ranged from news, 
to drama, to documentaries, and, finally, to the political theater of agitprop. 
He considered, and rejected, the model of broadcast news and information. 
"My first decision," Houseman wrote, "was to get away from the single-voice 
news reporting of the private stations and [the] BBC."16 Network reports were 
of substantial length, personal and direct. Reporters were individuals who 
created a direct link between event and listener.17 Moreover, network stories 
tended to be based on eyewitness accounts. This was a journalism of authen-
ticating, carefully chosen detail. It reflected a belief that "concrete terms pro-
duce more vivid impressions than abstract ones. . . ,"18 Through what Hugh 
Kenner has called a "connoisseurship of facts," network journalism convinced 
Americans through words what it could not show them through pictures: that 
it spoke the truth.19 But Houseman was looking for a broadcast style with 
greater energy, freshness and vitality than he felt he could get from news broad-
casts.20 
Instead of from news, Houseman selected his models from radio drama, 
radio documentary and live political theater. By World War II, radio dramatists 
had developed a variety of techniques by which to reach an audience and 
maintain its interest. This, Houseman hoped, could be done through the use of 
dialogue, at times interspersed with narration. 
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The British writer and producer Martin Esslin indirectly explained 
Houseman's reliance on dialogue in An Anatomy of Drama. He recalled setting 
out to write a radio script in the late 1940's for the BBC World Service that 
would depict an employment office in such a way as to present a positive image 
of Britain. "I could have written a purely literary, discursive description," he 
explained, one in which the narrator might say: 
The official asks the applicant for a job 
to give him the relevant details. He is not 
unfriendly although he maintains a certain 
reserve and distance, yet at the same time 
it is quite apparent from the tone of voice 
he uses that he is genuinely trying to help 
the person in front of him. . . .21 
But, wrote Esslin, such a description would merely have sounded "like a very 
special pleading with a purely propagandistic intention." Instead, Esslin broke 
up what he had to say into dialogue: 
OFFICIAL: Do sit down. 
APPLICANT: Thank you. 
OFFICIAL: Now let's see. Your name is . . . ? 
APPLICANT: John Smith. 
OFFICIAL: And your last job was . . . ? 
APPLICANT: Machinist. 
OFFICIAL: I see.22 
Drama avoided the tone of a special pleading. It conveyed a sense of the 
concrete by making its points in specific terms. This kind of dialogue invited 
the listener to step inside the room, move into the action, and sit down on a 
third side of the desk and achieved, thereby, a special intimacy with him.23 
Finally, it gave color to actions; it made what the producer wanted to tell come 
alive; hence, it captured and held the listener's attention.24 
The most important American radio drama and feature writer of the thirties, 
with whom Houseman, like most radio-listening Americans, was conversant, was 
Norman Corwin. Unlike many writers whose radio careers were short, and who 
quickly moved on to write novels or Hollywood screen plays, Corwin devoted 
his life to radio. He exerted an enormous impact on American radio writing in 
general, and on Houseman's Voice of America in particular.25 
Corwin's skill and style is well illustrated in a play entitled "So This is 
Radio," one of a five-part series he wrote in 1939 to dramatize the art of 
broadcasting. The fifth installment explored the role of music, which Corwin 
did not by playing music, but by using words, alone. He put together a 
montage of briskly paced speeches, in which the main character was the 
Average Listener, a man without name, personality, or distinguishing character-
istics. 
FIRST VOICE: This is a program about music, and a little 
about you. 
SECOND VOICE: It's going to be an unusual sort of program 
for a number of reasons, to wit: 
THIRD VOICE: Although it concerns serious music, you won't 
hear much serious music. 
FOURTH VOICE: Although it concerns light music, you won't 
hear much light music. 
FIFTH VOICE: Although it concerns a seemingly simple phase 
of radio, actually the subject is quite complex 
SIXT VOICE: Although this program is already one-thirtieth 
gone by, it has yet to make a formal opening an-
nouncement. . . P6 
Corwin presented music through the sound of words. His dialogue was often 
very short and choppy, moving the listener along at a fast pace. Corwin's 
example of a radio play done entirely as dialogue exemplified a type of radio 
drama which greatly influenced early Voice of America news and features. 
Not only did Houseman model the Voice of America on styles and forms he 
found in thirties radio drama, he looked as well to radio documentaries, as they 
had emerged in the 1930's. They were part of a larger movement, which 
included films, such as Pare Lorenz's The Plow That Broke the Plain, books, 
such as James Agee's Let Us Now Praise Famous Men and photographs, such 
as those taken by Walker Evans to parallel Agee's text. Documentary expres-
sion, in turn, was connected to the larger artistic movement of social realism in 
a decade of commitment, in which liberals and radicals used artistic forms in the 
belief that through their art they could transform society.27 The documentary 
movement was, in this sense, an admitted form of propaganda.28 It was one in 
which real pictures, people, events and information were portrayed through an 
art form which reflected and highlighted reality—rather than being reality.29 
Houseman was also well acquainted with the most popular and important 
American radio documentary program during the 1930's, The March of Time. 
This was a fully scripted studio event. Originated in 1931 by Time magazine, 
each half-hour segment required one thousand hours of labor and an entire week 
of preparation. The March of Time, both on the radio and, after mid-decade, 
also on film, provided its audience with a weekly dramatization of important 
events, re-enacted by a stable of actors adept at impersonation.30 The series was 
exciting, and it became, as one radio historian has written, the "major example 
of how . . . the news story or essay on radio was most naturally cast as 
drama."31 Although The March of Time sounded less like the Voice of America 
than other contemporary programs, such as "So This Is Radio," the idea that 
news could be re-enacted in a studio proved crucial to the development of 
Houseman's Voice of America.32 
Behind these experimental forms of radio drama, features and documentaries 
lay several broader artistic movements. There was, to begin with, an attempt to 
define America as a unique, new world culture, which was equal—if not bet-
ter—to that of the old world. This search for culture merged with the ideal of 
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social commitment. It produced an idealization of the group and the commu-
nity. It highlighted the notion that Americans were a "folk," a native people 
whose Americanness transcended their ethnic and regional differences. This 
notion of "folk," in turn, became a means to define the collective identity of the 
American people.33 These ideas were taken up and translated by artists and 
writers of all kinds. In radio it produced a type of drama built on the literary 
device of using typical, but nameless, people. 
The theatrical device of using nameless people to present human types and 
express political ideas was heavily influenced by the post World War I German 
theater of Expressionism. In the twenties the Expressionists began to use cari-
catures or types as a standard literary device, rather than to develop realistic 
characters. Moreover, the Expressionists attacked the tradition of careful plotting 
and complete storytelling by constructing their plays, instead, from a series of 
scenes that succeeded each other with a rapid, almost cinemagraphic speed.34 
By the 1930's, the once revolutionary forms of Expressionism had become 
literary conventions.35 The abstract forms of Expressionism, moreover, found 
particularly fertile ground in radio precisely because radio was a non-visual form 
of art. On the stage an actor could be costumed to represent a generic "man," 
rather than a particular person, but he still stood on the stage in costume. In 
live theater this sort of simplification easily became too obviously stylized. But 
broadcasters could do away with everything not necessary for dramatic action, 
and the actor could portray not only a discrete individual, but "man" in gen-
eral.36 
Houseman used all of these styles during his tenure as director of the Voice 
of America. In so doing he drew upon the forms which were available to him 
as part of the culture of the thirties. This is important. It places the early 
Voice of America broadcasts directly within a specific cultural tradition. Once 
so recognized, the roots of the Voice of America can no longer be assumed to 
lie within the tradition of news broadcasting. Houseman's Voice of America 
was a distinctly American and a self-consciously thirties radio production. 
But the single most important precedent came not from radio, but from live 
theater, both on the stage and on the street. It was the political theater of 
agitation and propaganda, known as agitprop. In the years directly following the 
revolution, the new Soviet government had used street theater to support the 
revolution; there, street theater was a means to brings news and propaganda to 
illiterate peasants and workers. But while it began in Russia, agitprop flowered 
in Germany, where a post-war revolution had failed, and discontent and anger 
continued against the Weimar government. In Germany, agitprop was wielded 
against the government, not in support of it.37 
Agitprop dramatists used many of the techniques of Expressionism. The 
artistry of montage, for example, had very practical applications for political 
theater. The revue facilitated highly political plays without forcing any unity of 
action.38 Agitprop, like Expressionism, shed the individual man, like a layer of 
unwanted skin; it portrayed, instead, man as an archetype. As Erwin Piscator, 
the most important German agitprop producer, wrote: "It is no longer the 
private, personal fate of the individual, but the times and the fate of the masses 
that are the heroic factors in the new drama." It altered and distorted dramatic 
dialogue to allow heavier use of political slogans, while it made use of choral 
chants to represent the will of the people.39 Agitprop entered the United States 
through the workers' theater movement of the late 1920's, and gradually the 
worker's theater movement exerted a direct influence on mainstream American 
theater.40 
Agitprop was in the air in the New York theater world of the late thirties. 
As one Voice of America script writer later recalled: "I found it [agitprop] very 
exciting in the sense that this was very limited drama, but very effective, and 
that was the important thing." He went on to explain that his introduction to 
agitprop "was the first time it had occurred to me that art is a weapon, that this 
is a way to get people interested, excited and explain things."41 If Houseman 
did not know agitprop as street theater, and it seems highly unlikely that he did 
not, he did know it in its Federal Theatre Project incarnation, the Living 
Newspaper, one of the five units which comprised the government enterprise. 
Sponsored by the New York Newspaper Guild, the Living Newspaper not only 
dramatized the news: "it showed . . . the struggle of many different kinds of 
people to understand the natural, social and economic forces around them, and 
to achieve through these forces a better life for more people." It was, as Harry 
Hopkins noted, propaganda, a mild, very American form of protest through 
propaganda, whose goal was "to educate the consumer . . ,"42 
The Living Newspaper in particular, and agitprop more generally, presented 
Houseman with an artistic, exciting style of propaganda; it was an obvious 
model for the Voice of America. It is not surprising, therefore, that as director 
of the Voice of America Houseman employed the essence of the form: staccato 
dialogue; choral chants; shifting scenes; and the use of stereotyped figures. 
The whole of any fifteen minute language program can be imagined, if seen in 
its entirety, as a kind of revue, a new form of drama that would allow America 
to say to the oppressed peoples of Europe what Piscator had argued in another 
context: "This is the type of society in which you live, you cannot escape it— 
here it is again, and again!"43 
It was not an exact copy. Houseman turned agitprop inside out. In the late 
thirties the Living Newspaper landed the Federal Theater Project in political 
trouble because Congress considered the experimental plays too radical and 
protested against Federal funding of what they labeled subversive drama. 
Congress misunderstood the essence of agitprop in America, where social and 
political protest became a way for immigrants to join mainstream America. But 
Houseman moved agitprop still further from its original European context by 
using it to assert a positive image of America and to attack the Axis. In his 
hands it became a weapon to defend democracy and attack fascism. 
i i i 
These artistic movements were an integral part of Houseman's world. He 
used this wide range of dramatic devices in order to create a distinctively 
American broadcast propaganda. In order to understand how he did so, we must 
turn to the programs of the Voice of America, first to describe them and then 
to place them within the context of thirties culture. 
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The Voice of America broadcast from New York to Europe in all the 
languages of Western Europe twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. 
Although the actual programs were written by language desks staffed by exiles 
and emigres, it was Houseman who directed the station and who infused it with 
his vision of how to create good broadcast propaganda. One of his very first 
decisions was that the Voice of America was to "be represented by several 
voices of different quality and pitch carefully orchestrated to achieve a maxi-
mum of variety and energy."44 Four announcers were provided for all shows, 
and multiple voices introduced each and every program: 
FIRST VOICE: This is New York, the United States of 
America, calling the people of Europe. 
SECOND VOICE: Every morning at this time you hear 
our voices from America 
THIRD VOICE: telling you what this country is doing 
and thinking towards winning the war.45 
This was an important decision. The multiple voices of the announcers told the 
listener, by the very sounds of the statement and the rapidity of shifting tones, 
that this was the Voice of America, as no other propaganda station employed 
similar techniques. Multiple voices gave the Voice a distinctive aural pattern of 
pitch, duration and rhythm. 
News headlines came next. By their content they established a tone of 
truth. They created a framework, a context, of traditional news broadcasting 
and, hence, veracity.46 This was, after all, how Houseman and Welles had 
introduced The War of the Worlds. But despite the function of the headlines 
as news, they were announced as staccato chords, short and disconnected, and 
as such, reflected Houseman's dramatic approach to the presentation of propa-
ganda. A headline might be only ten words long, and take but a few seconds 
to read on the radio, but each headline was announced by a different voice, as 
in this show of April 15, 1942: 
FIRST VOICE: Laval is back in power in vichy [sic]. 
The American government will only make its 
position known when the composition of the Laval 
cabinet has been officially announced. 
SECOND VOICE: On the Russian front Soviet troops 
have won several successes. 
THIRD VOICE: During the whole of yesterday the RAF 
attacked German installations in Normandy. 
FOURTH VOICE: President [Roosevelt] declared 
that the present war was a life and death struggle 
where the fate of our entire civilization was at 
stake.47 
As in Expressionist theater, the Unes were staccato and distorted. As in docu-
mentary expression, facts were used like bits of paint, brushed on the canvas to 
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create a composite picture meant to persuade the audience to a particular view-
point. As in folk drama, news came from everywhere announced by symbolic 
voices rather than real characters. And as in agitprop theater, the news was 
personified, giving distinct characterization to news about Laval, the Soviet war 
effort, the Royal Air Force, or President Roosevelt. 
This animated technique extended from the introduction to headlines to 
expanded news accounts. "Yesterday," a report on the war in the Far East 
broadcast on Wednesday, August 5, 1942, began, "there was good news on the 
fighting front in China": 
FIRST VOICE: It came in communiques from Lt. General 
Joseph Stilwell which announced that American 
warplanes are now in full cooperation with the 
Chinese offensive. Here is that important commu-
nique: 
SECOND VOICE: American bombers and fighters attacked 
Japanese headquarters at Linchuan in Kiangsi Prov-
ince, dropping demolition and incendiary bombs 
while Chinese ground troops were attacking.48 
Two voices, two places: by employing two speakers Houseman implied that 
the second voice carried a message of special importance. Moreover, the second 
speaker was the nameless personification of the war-front communique, and not 
an anonymous voice reading a neutral piece of information. The voices, 
moreover, divided up the news into neat chunks of information; they defined 
each news segment from that which had preceded or followed it, and multiple 
voices created a "political revue" out of each fifteen minute language segment. 
Furthermore, while the magic of radio transported the listener to China, the 
propagandist turned the war communique into an argument underlining the 
heroic American war effort, the damage done to the enemy and the close 
cooperation maintained with the Chinese. Just as Martin Esslin had preferred 
drama to discursive prose, by expressing sentiments through brief dialogue, 
Houseman hoped to let these points emerge from the text. Dialogue turned 
Voice of America news into symbolic action. 
Houseman extended this theatrical format to features. One feature, for 
example, described through the poetic form of a litany the severity of Nazi rule 
and the consequences to the French of the German plan to conscript French 
workers: 
VOICE: Such is the law of Nazi Germany. 
VOICE: All that is forbidden is required. 
VOICE: Such is the voice Hitler wants to impose on the 
world. 
VOICE: All that is forbidden is required. 
VOICE: Such is the law the Vichy Kommandatur wants to 
impose on the French. 
VOICE: Free Expression, 
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VOICE: 
VOICE 
VOICE 
VOICE 
VOICE 
FORBIDDEN. 
To be a patriot, 
FORBIDDEN. 
To eat enough, 
FORBIDDEN.49 
Moving back and forth between statements of what the French needed and 
wanted, and the inevitable Axis response, the dialogue expressed these ideas 
through impersonal, disembodied voices. It was verse as dialogue, which be-
cause it was poetry, removed the action from the everyday, familiar sphere of 
life. In its highly stylized form, in its repetitive and exaggerated pace, it told 
the listener that the Voice of America was condemning German action.50 
Houseman used multiple voices to achieve drama and immediacy, not accu-
racy, but he also worked his shows to further the propaganda directives which 
the leaders of the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information, under 
whose aegis the Voice of America operated, sent down on a monthly, weekly 
and daily basis. The standing directive of March 11, 1942, for example, in-
structed the Voice to project the expansion of American military forces and to 
broadcast positive news concerning American military operations.51 In response, 
the Voice of America broadcast a story of a U.S. Army Air Force bombing 
expedition over Burma that "in spite of the blinding monsoon downpour. . . 
smashed the Japanese airdrome. . . ." The story was inherently dramatic, but 
the multiple voice format made it more so. Having outlined the main facts of 
the story, the announcers added: 
VOICE: So heavy at times was the rain through which our 
bombers flew that one of the pilots said: 
VOICE: It wasn't airplane piloting. It was submarine 
navigation.52 
Again, the Voice personified the impersonal news and used drama to bring the 
story to life, and the listener into the action. 
Houseman's use of thirties radio styles and agitprop drama set the original 
Voice of America apart from any other propaganda radio station of the era. The 
dominant cultural themes reflected in Voice of America broadcasting were those 
of a culture of innovation, of political commitment and social realism and of a 
new nationalism. Radio broadcasting itself was a new technology which de-
manded experimental forms, and the fact that Houseman employed the most 
experimental techniques of radio implied a special American openness. Docu-
mentary expression came out of an era in which commitment to improve the 
lives of ordinary people who were suffering the shock and hardship of depres-
sion became a paramount theme of American culture. Houseman used ideas 
from documentary radio to express American commitment to end Axis oppres-
sion. In thirties America the drama of the nameless person, anybody and 
nobody, the representatives of all of "the people", became a search for a tran-
scendent identification in a land composed of many regions and diverse ethnic 
groups and an assertion of the greatness of America. And Houseman expressed 
the vitality of this America through his style of broadcasting. Finally, agitprop, 
once it took root in America, became a means to create a political revue out of 
the news and to affirm a national commitment to the war effort. 
Houseman employed these forms to project an image of a democratic, in-
dustrious America at war. For example, the chanting form of a feature such as 
"This is the Law of Nazi Germany," projected an image of a democracy, a 
nation of many voices working together to win the war. Houseman created the 
image of an industrious America through the vital, excited tones of his radio 
style. This was a nation which, despite its heterogeneity, had a sense of self. 
It would never crumble before the Axis threat. 
But these forms did more than demonstrate American democracy. Form ex-
presses the artist's vision; it is symbolic action. In the case of agitprop drama, 
the form was intended to persuade the audience to take action, just as it had 
tried to do on the streets of Germany. By personifying a communique from 
General Stilwell, Houseman was arguing that news from China was not merely 
a collection of inert facts. Houseman wanted dialogue to tell the ordinary 
person that she or he could take action that would affect the course of events. 
The broadcast style of the Voice of America conveyed a political message and 
a propaganda goal. Through the forms of its programs the Voice of America 
told its audience to rise up and overthrow the Axis. It urged Europeans to take 
their fate in their own hands: to resist. 
Houseman's choice of forms and styles, the Voice of America as it was for 
the first year and a half of its existence, thus implemented a critical political de-
cision. It is one which we need to understand in order to evaluate early 
American overseas propaganda. Houseman's goal—and that of the American 
propaganda leaders in general—was to use propaganda to provoke European 
resistance and undermine the Axis from within. It was, as we have said, a 
fourth fighting arm of the war. And this Houseman tried to effect through his 
highly stylized, and very aggressive form of radio propaganda. 
This goal implied those whom Houseman and his colleagues had defined as 
their audience: the oppressed masses of Europe, who had not profited from, nor 
collaborated with, the Axis powers, but who were suffering and who, therefore, 
would hopefully resist the enemy. Nevertheless, when Houseman took over the 
Voice of America, he did not know who the actual audience would be, or even 
if the Voice would have one. Perhaps for this reason the propagandists never 
articulated a clear concept of audience. As one of the earliest of the Voice 
writers later recalled, "we didn't know whether we were talking to ourselves; we 
didn't know whether anyone was hearing us at all . . . we were sailing, flying 
blind."53 Embedded in the text of their broadcasts was what literary critics call 
an "implied" reader, or for us, an implied listener. This is why we must look 
for the propagandists' understanding of their audience in the literary styles and 
forms of Voice of America broadcasts.54 
To begin with, there were no specialized programs in 1942, and, beyond the 
standard news and features, by early 1943, only one show for women and 
another for labor. This was not for want of ideas, for a year later the Military 
Show, the Religious Show, the European Show, Day by Day and a variety of 
other specialized programs filled the airwaves. Nor was it from want of staff. 
34 
Rather, it reflected a concept of audience in which all of France, Germany or 
Italy was considered as one. The listeners formed a "mass," that could be 
provoked into action through words alone, as a charismatic leader could ignite 
a crowd through speech and force of personality. Just as the Voice stripped 
many of its characters of their individuality in the news and feature shows, so 
this literary concept of audience denied the same individuality, or uniqueness of 
interest, to the listener. The listeners were an undifferentiated group addressed 
by many anonymous voices. Because the technology of radio allowed millions 
of people simultaneously to turn on the same program at the same moment, 
Houseman saw radio propaganda as a technique to approach a large crowd of 
people: a message directed to the masses. 
But they were wrong. Radio is an intimate medium. Its message moves 
through the power of speech, which introduces a very personal element Radio 
can achieve the intimacy of a conversation between two people. The sound of 
the voice, the personality of the speaker: these are the special properties of 
radio broadcasting. And the radio audience, too, is very special. It is absolutely 
distinct from the audiences of live theater or film. Large groups of people 
assemble in theater houses for movies or dramas, but people gather in very 
small units of one or two or three to listen to the radio. As the German 
psychologist Rudolph Arnheim has written: "the wireless addresses those mil-
lions [in the audience] not as a mass but as individuals. It talks to every one 
individually, not to everyone together."55 This was the magic of Roosevelt in 
his fireside chats and Edward R. Murrow in his reports from London. Roosevelt 
and Murrow could persuade their listeners to a political position because they 
came across as people, as public personalities who were at the same time 
ordinary people, speaking to other quite ordinary people.56 
This brings us, finally, to the question of how Europeans actually perceived 
the Voice of America. Each nation had its own radio service by World War 
II, and the peoples of Europe were, therefore, conditioned to think of radio 
broadcasting within the cultural framework of their own broadcasts. British 
radio, for example, by contrast to American radio, was not only a state financed 
monopoly with no competition built into the system, its sound was more sub-
dued. When the British pollster and social scientist, Mark Abrams, travelled to 
New York to work with the Voice of America in late 1942, he found the station 
"hammy. I remember shuddering," he recalled, and described the Voice's tone 
as rather like "selling Colgate toothpaste, urgently . . . ."57 Cultural styles 
formed a barrier of taste and habit. 
In attempting to assess the impact of the Voice of America it is crucial to 
remember these caveats, especially as there is no good evidence of who was 
listening in Europe, how often or to what effect. How could there be in war-
torn Europe where listening remained outlawed, few escaped the continent, and 
even fewer could be relied upon to tell the truth to the Allied interviewers? 
This makes internal evidence all the more important What we do know is that 
Houseman chose broadcast formats that sounded not only impersonal, but very 
American. It seems logical to conclude that the Voice of America broadcasts 
were jammed not only by enemy signals, but by cultural interference. 
Houseman's propaganda was innovative and brilliant But it is doubtful that it 
persuaded the people of Europe to resist the Nazis or Nazi collaborators, or that 
it persuaded them to admire the United States, if they did not already do so. 
iv 
The leaders of the Office of War Information jettisoned Houseman's ap-
proach to propaganda in 1943 for a series of mutually reinforcing reasons. 
While Congress did not dismantle the Voice of America, it did express increas-
ing discontent with the station's liberal political positions and its radical thirties 
tone, as did the State Department. Together they forced a change in the lead-
ership of the Office of War Information and the Voice of America.58 
Moreover, by 1943 it had become clear that the Allies would win the war 
and, therefore, mass revolt increasingly served no military purpose. With the 
momentum of mounting victories the war became its own best salesman, and 
American propagandists concentrated on giving their news-starved audiences 
reports about the actual course of the war. Furthermore, the ascendancy of 
fascists to political power in Allied occupied territories following the Allied 
invasion of North Africa and the overthrow of Mussolini rendered the liberal 
foreign policy positions of 1942 difficult for the American propagandists to 
maintain. Instead, they turned to a low-keyed, informational propaganda in the 
broadcasting style of network news. A new political viewpoint demanded a new 
artistic vision. 
Throughout 1942 Houseman had tried to make Europe see America as demo-
cratic, energetic and egalitarian. He had worked to encourage the peoples of 
Europe to rise up and overthrow their Nazi and Fascist rulers. He had chosen 
a broadcasting style he believed would accomplish this twin mission. It was 
not, however, a broadcasting style the Voice of America would ever again use. 
American propagandists, through the trial and error of Houseman's experiment, 
rejected experimental drama and agitprop theater as not only ineffective, but too 
radical for an America which had emerged as a world leader and a bastion of 
global stability. 
Washington, d.c. 
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